Fordham Law Review
Volume 85

Issue 6

Article 17

2017

Leaders and Laggards: Tackling State Legislative Responses to
the Youth Sports Concussion Epidemic
Chris Lau
Fordham University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Education Law Commons, Health Law and Policy Commons, and the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
Chris Lau, Leaders and Laggards: Tackling State Legislative Responses to the Youth Sports Concussion
Epidemic, 85 Fordham L. Rev. 2879 (2017).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol85/iss6/17

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

LEADERS AND LAGGARDS: TACKLING
STATE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO THE
YOUTH SPORTS CONCUSSION EPIDEMIC
Chris Lau*
In 2009, state legislatures began to enact concussion safety laws to protect
youth athletes suffering from traumatic brain injuries sustained during the
course of play. By 2014, all fifty states and the District of Columbia had
enacted some form of youth sports concussion legislation. Yet these statutes
vary widely across states in terms of the protections offered to youth athletes.
This Note provides an analysis of state legislation by classifying all fifty-one
statutes among distinct tiers ranging from least to most protective.
These laws have generally targeted the secondary risks of concussions,
which emerge after a youth athlete has suffered a traumatic brain injury.
While the prevention of secondary risks is an important element of
concussion management, future legislators should also consider the primary
risks of concussions by focusing on reducing the risk of injury before it
occurs. This Note advocates that, to ensure the adequate protection of all
youth athletes, future legislators must continue to prevent secondary risks by
expanding coverage and strengthening enforcement mechanisms. In
addition, legislators must address the primary risks of concussions by
mandating certain rule changes, which, over time, may begin to transform
societal attitudes toward the seriousness of sports-related concussions.
While many youth sports organizations and even professional sports leagues
have begun to implement certain rule changes to increase player safety, these
changes would gain greater efficacy if backed by the force of law. This Note
lays out recommendations for a model statute to provide guidance for future
legislators.

* J.D. Candidate, 2018, Fordham University School of Law; B.S., 2013, University of
Pennsylvania. I would like to thank Professor Jed Shugerman for his guidance and my friends
and family for their continued support.
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INTRODUCTION
In October of 2006, Zackery Lystedt was thirteen years old and a gifted
athlete who played on his junior high school football team.1 During a game,
Zackery struck the ground headfirst after tackling an opponent.2 A video of
the game shows Zackery lying on the ground with his hands clutching both
sides of his helmet.3 Despite the injury, Zackery was allowed back into the
game just fifteen minutes later.4
Late in the second half of the game, Zackery collapsed on the field and
was airlifted to a nearby hospital.5 Doctors removed parts of his skull to
relieve pressure from his hemorrhaging brain.6 Zackery spent the next three
months in a coma.7 It took nine months before he could speak his first word,
thirteen months before he could move a limb, and almost two years before he
could eat without the assistance of a feeding tube.8
In May of 2009, the Washington State Legislature enacted the Zackery
Lystedt Law9 (“the Lystedt Law”), the nation’s first comprehensive youth
sports concussion safety act.10 The statute required any youth athlete
showing signs of a concussion to be examined and cleared by a licensed
health-care provider before being permitted to return to play.11 Today, over
ten years after his injury, Zackery has embraced his eponymous role as the
face of youth sports concussion legislation; however, he walks with a limp,
wears thick glasses specially designed to aid his peripheral vision, and
struggles to remember his daily schedule.12 Had the Washington law been
in place in October of 2006, it is likely that Zackery would not have been
permitted to reenter the game; his life-altering injury may have been
avoided.13

1. See The Lystedt Law: A Concussion Survivor’s Journey, CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION (Mar. 12, 2010) [hereinafter The Lystedt Law], http://www.cdc.gov/
media/subtopic/matte/pdf/031210-Zack-story.pdf [https://perma.cc/5L7S-4XYN].
2. See Sheila Mickool, Taking Brain Injuries out of Sports, SEATTLE MAG. (Apr. 9,
2013), http://www.seattlemag.com/article/taking-brain-injuries-out-sports [https://perma.cc/
FER4-BJ62].
3. See The Lystedt Law, supra note 1.
4. See Chantal Anderson, State Lawmakers Approve Concussion Bills for Young
Athletes, SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 11, 2009), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/
politics/state-lawmakers-approve-concussion-bills-for-young-athletes [https://perma.cc/46P
W-78Z5].
5. See The Lystedt Law, supra note 1.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.600.190 (2009).
10. See Mickool, supra note 2.
11. See WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.600.190.
12. See Patricia Guthrie, Ex Youth Football Player: You Could End Up Like Me, WEBMD
(Oct. 21, 2015), http://www.webmd.com/brain/news/20151021/concussion-zack-lystedt
[https://perma.cc/2QWM-2FVW].
13. See id.
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Still, there is no guarantee that the law would have prevented Zackery’s
injury.14 The “macho culture” that has persisted in sports for decades has, at
least in part, weakened the application of the law and, thus, its
effectiveness.15 While state legislation has helped to increase awareness of
this public health issue,16 there remains a “culture of resistance” in terms of
reporting injuries within both youth and professional sports.17 Moreover,
even where the laws of different states are virtually identical, there is
tremendous variation in enforcement.18
This Note examines the disparities among state legislation and analyzes
whether such legislation alone is sufficient to quell the “concussion
epidemic.”19 While many states have adopted ample precautions to protect
children like Zackery and the millions of other youth athletes that are put at
risk each year,20 others provide inadequate safeguards. Part I of this Note
provides background information necessary to understand the stakes of this
legislation by exploring the long-term effects of traumatic brain injury (TBI)
and the broad spectrum of protections offered across different states. Then,
Part II classifies where certain state statutes lie along this spectrum, analyzes
the strengths and weaknesses of state legislation, examines enforcement
mechanisms, and assesses the actions taken by the federal government.
Finally, Part III recommends provisions for an updated model code and
proposes an increased emphasis on primary prevention.
I. YOUTH SPORTS CONCUSSIONS
AND STATE LEGISLATION: AN OVERVIEW
Before assessing the effectiveness of existing legislation, it is necessary to
understand the two key issues at hand: (1) the lasting impact of a TBI and
14. See, e.g., Hosea H. Harvey, Refereeing the Public Health, 14 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y
L. & ETHICS 66, 113–14 (2014); Marie-France Wilson, Youth Athletes at Risk: Preventing and
Managing Consequences of Sports Concussions in Young Athletes and the Related Legal
Issues, 21 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 241, 288 (2010) (noting that existing state legislation “may
not go far enough”).
15. See LINDA CARROLL & DAVID ROSNER, THE CONCUSSION CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A
SILENT EPIDEMIC 35–67 (2011) (discussing the “macho culture” that exists in football, even at
the youth level).
16. See infra notes 44 and 217 and accompanying text.
17. See COMM. ON SPORTS-RELATED CONCUSSIONS IN YOUTH, INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RES.
COUNCIL, NAT’L ACADS., SPORTS-RELATED CONCUSSIONS IN YOUTH: IMPROVING THE SCIENCE,
CHANGING THE CULTURE 7, 43–44 (Robert Graham et al. eds., 2014),
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK169016/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK169016.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9NWC-S7XT].
18. Kerri McGowan Lowrey & Stephanie R. Morain, State Experiences Implementing
Youth Sports Concussion Laws: Challenges, Successes, and Lessons for Evaluating Impact,
42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 290, 294 (2014).
19. See NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON MILD
TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY IN THE UNITED STATES: STEPS TO PREVENT A SERIOUS PUBLIC
HEALTH PROBLEM (2003) [hereinafter CDC, 2003 REPORT], http://www.cdc.gov/
traumaticbraininjury/pdf/mtbireport-a.pdf (“Traumatic brain injury is frequently referred to as
the silent epidemic because the problems that result from it (e.g., impaired memory) often are
not visible.”) [https://perma.cc/SH7Q-H8G8].
20. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
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(2) the current laws in place to limit such effects. Part I.A provides an
overview of concussions and the consequencesespecially among
childrenthat can result from missed diagnoses. Next, Part I.B discusses the
arc of state legislative responses. Then, Part I.C analyzes Washington State’s
Lystedt Law and evaluates the laws of other states using the Lystedt Law as
a benchmark.
A. Concussions: Definitions, Diagnoses, and Scope
To evaluate the role that legislation should play within the concussion
epidemic, it is useful to examine the types of TBI that such legislation is
designed to address. A TBI is defined by the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) as “an injury that disrupts the normal function of the
brain.”21 It can be caused by a bump, blow, or jolt to the head or a penetrating
head injury.22 TBIs range from mild to severe.23 A mild TBI is characterized
by any period of transient confusion, disorientation, or impaired
consciousness, dysfunction of memory around the time of injury, or loss of
consciousness lasting less than thirty minutes.24 Severe TBIs involve
extended periods of unconsciousness lasting longer than thirty minutes,
posttraumatic amnesia lasting longer than twenty-four hours, or penetrating
skull injury.25
Concussions are classified as a type of mild TBI because they are not
usually life threatening.26 While a single concussion will typically not cause
death, suffering repeated concussions increases the risk of second impact
syndrome, a potentially fatal condition that occurs when a second concussion
is sustained before the symptoms of the first concussion have cleared.27 One
severe effect of second impact syndrome is chronic traumatic encephalopathy
(CTE).28 CTE is a progressive degenerative disease of the brain, common in

21. NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON TRAUMATIC
BRAIN INJURY IN THE UNITED STATES: EPIDEMIOLOGY AND REHABILITATION (2015)
[hereinafter CDC, 2015 REPORT], http://www.cdc.gov/traumaticbraininjury/pdf/tbi_report_
to_congress_epi_and_rehab-a.pdf [https://perma.cc/JJ65-DDJP].
22. See id.
23. See CDC, 2003 REPORT, supra note 19.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GET A HEADS UP ON CONCUSSIONS IN
SPORTS POLICIES: INFORMATION FOR PARENTS, COACHES, AND SCHOOL & SPORTS
PROFESSIONALS (2013) [hereinafter CDC, HEADS UP], http://www.cdc.gov/headsup/pdfs/
policy/headsuponconcussioninsportspolicies-a.pdf [https://perma.cc/LTN7-BFAA]; What Is a
Concussion?, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/headsup/
basics/concussion_whatis.html (last updated Jan. 31, 2017) [https://perma.cc/DN7S-N5PK].
27. See Scott D. Bender et al., Historical Perspectives, in TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY IN
SPORTS: AN INTERNATIONAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 3, 11 (Mark R. Lovell et al.
eds., 2004).
28. See Ann C. McKee et al., Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy in Athletes:
Progressive Tauopathy After Repetitive Head Injury, 68 J. NEUROPATHOLOGY &
EXPERIMENTAL NEUROLOGY 709, 709 (2009).
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individuals who have suffered multiple TBIs.29 CTE symptoms generally
begin with memory loss, followed by progressive deterioration, often leading
to dementia, Alzheimer’s disease, or parkinsonism.30
In light of CTE’s severe consequences, it is especially important to
recognize concussion symptoms among youth athletes, whose age and
continuing neurological development render them more susceptible to
concussions with longer recovery times.31 The brains of adolescent children
are still undergoing neurological reorganization.32 For example, in
adolescents, the frontal lobean area of the brain that is particularly
vulnerable to the effects of concussionsis especially fragile because it
develops in spurts.33 Given that the frontal regions of the brain are
responsible for decision making and information management,34 early
diagnosis in young athletes is incredibly valuable.
Yet identifying a sports-related concussion is one of the most difficult
tasks for sports medicine professionals because there is no biological marker
for an accurate diagnosis.35 Symptoms of concussions generally include
confusion, headache, lack of balance, dizziness, and disorientation.36 These
latent symptoms are often easier to overlook than more outwardly visible
signs, such as nausea, vomiting, or sensitivity to noise or light.37 This issue
is exacerbated by the tendency of young athletes to underreport signs of
concussions, so that, among other reasons, they can return to play more
quickly.38
The scope of this issue is extensive: the CDC estimates that between 1.6
and 3.8 million sports-related TBIs occur every year in the United States.39
29. See id.
30. See id. at 710. Parkinsonism shares symptoms found in Parkinson’s disease, but
parkinsonism is a symptom complex and differs from Parkinson’s disease, which is a specific
neurodegenerative illness. Paul J. Tuite & Kimberly Krawczewski, Parkinsonism: A Reviewof-Systems Approach to Diagnosis, 27 SEMINARS NEUROLOGY 113, 113–14 (2007).
Parkinson’s disease is just one of the many potential causes of parkinsonism. Id.
31. See Sergio R. Russo Buzzini & Kevin M. Guskiewicz, Sport-Related Concussion in
the Young Athlete, 18 CURRENT OPINION PEDIATRICS 376, 377 (2006).
32. See Steven Reinberg, Teens May Fare Worse After Concussion Than Children or
Adults, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Feb. 28, 2012), http://health.usnews.com/health-news/
news/articles/2012/02/28/teens-may-fare-worse-after-concussion-than-children-or-adults
[https://perma.cc/2DFG-C23G].
33. See id.
34. See Antoine Bechara et al., Emotion, Decision Making and the Orbitofrontal Cortex,
10 CEREBRAL CORTEX 295, 295 (2000).
35. See Michael McCrea et al., Unreported Concussion in High School Football Players:
Implications for Prevention, 14 CLINICAL J. SPORT MED. 13, 13 (2004) (“The diagnosis of
sports-related concussion is perhaps the most elusive challenge facing sports medicine
clinicians.”); see also Harvey, supra note 14, at 75 (noting that best practices in the
identification of TBIs now involve precompetition baseline measurements and computerized
testing, provided by companies such as ImPACT); infra Part III.A.2.
36. See CARROLL & ROSNER, supra note 15, at 10–11.
37. See id. at 10 (“It’s hard to take seriously an invisible injury with subtle symptoms that
often seem to pass quickly.”).
38. See McCrea et al., supra note 35, at 13–14.
39. Jean A. Langlois et al., The Epidemiology and Impact of Traumatic Brain Injury: A
Brief Overview, 21 J. HEAD TRAUMA REHABILITATION 375, 375–76 (2006) (“Although a
previous [CDC] study estimated that approximately 300,000 such injuries occur each year, it
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This estimate is conservative due to the unknown number of concussions that
are treated at home or simply go unrecognized.40 Moreover, the potential
impact on youth athletes is significant: among youth ages fifteen to twentyfour, sports are a leading cause of TBI, second only to motor vehicle
accidents.41 This issue is aggravated by the risk of second impact syndrome
and the rising popularity of youth sports. Once an athlete suffers one
concussion, the risk of a second concussion increases three to six times.42 In
addition, according to the National Federation of State High School
Associations, nearly 7.9 million student athletes participated in high school
sports in 2015 to 2016, a number which is on the rise for the twenty-seventh
consecutive year.43
B. History of State Legislation
Over the past decade, the public has gained a greater appreciation of the
connection between sports and brain injuries as well as the general issues
associated with such injuries.44 This increased public awareness has led to
state legislative reforms, the first of which was enacted in Washington
State.45 Washington’s Lystedt Law, which most other states have emulated,
contains three primary components.46 First, it requires all public school
districts to provide annual educational programs and materials that inform
coaches, parents, and student athletes about the nature and risks of
concussions.47 Second, the law specifies that any athlete suspected of
sustaining a concussion during sports activity must be immediately removed
from play.48 Third, any such athlete may not return to action until she has
been evaluated by a licensed health-care provider who has been trained in the
included only TBIs for which the person reported a loss of consciousness. . . . [A] more
accurate approximation may be that 1.6 million to 3.8 million sports-related TBIs occur each
year, including those for which no medical care is sought. This estimate might still be low
because many of these injuries go unrecognized and thus uncounted.”).
40. Id. at 375.
41. Luke M. Gessel et al., Concussions Among United States High School and Collegiate
Athletes, 42 J. ATHLETIC TRAINING 495, 495 (2007).
42. Robert C. Cantu, Posttraumatic Retrograde and Anterograde Amnesia:
Pathophysiology and Implications in Grading and Safe Return to Play, 36 J. ATHLETIC
TRAINING 244, 246 (2001).
43. NAT’L FED’N OF STATE HIGH SCH. ASS’NS, NFHS HANDBOOK 2016–17, at 55 (2016),
http://www.nfhs.org/media/1017531/2016-17-nfhs-handbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/FJ6S-YZ
L2].
44. See, e.g., State v. McKague, 246 P.3d 558, 575 (Wash. Ct. App.) (Quinn-Brintnall, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that public awareness of brain injuries has
increased in recent years in part due to greater media coverage of such injuries and the
increased use of product warning labels), aff’d, 262 P.3d 1225 (Wash. 2011).
45. See Alex Marvez, Lystedt Lays Down Law on Concussions, FOX SPORTS (May
20, 2012), http://www.foxsports.com/nfl/story/zack-lystedt-bring-awareness-nfl-concussionissue-lystedt-law-052012 [https://perma.cc/8QZ3-W9K6].
46. See Lee Green, Legal Perspectives, Recommendations on State Concussion Laws,
NAT’L FED’N ST. HIGH SCH. ASSOCIATIONS (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.nfhs.org/articles/
legal-perspectives-recommendations-on-state-concussion-laws [https://perma.cc/CL96-G3
FZ].
47. See WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.600.190(2) (2016).
48. See id. § 28A.600.190(3).
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evaluation and management of concussions and has received written
clearance from that provider.49
Since the enactment of the Lystedt Law, all fifty states and the District of
Columbia have enacted youth sports concussion legislation.50 Both the
National Football League (NFL) and National Collegiate Athletic
Association have lobbied extensively for this legislation.51 On January 30,
2014, Mississippi Governor Phil Bryant signed into law the Mississippi
Youth Concussion Act, making Mississippi the fiftieth state to pass youth
sports concussion legislation.52 While the Mississippi Legislature clearly
used the Lystedt Law as a guide, it deviated from the Washington model in
that it requires neither annual education programs nor written medical
clearance.53
C. The Current Benchmark: Washington’s Lystedt Law
Since the Lystedt Law was enacted, most state legislatures have emulated
this statute in their own legislation.54 Therefore, the disparities that exist
across state statutes can be objectively measured by using Washington’s
Lystedt Law as a benchmark. To facilitate the comparison of various state
concussion laws, this Note provides relevant language from the Washington
statute below.
1. The Statute
Section 28A.600.190 of Washington’s Revised Code is entitled, “Youth
Sports—Concussion and Head Injury Guidelines—Injured Athlete
Restrictions.”55 Section 28A.600.190(1)(c) defines the problem that the
statute seeks to address: “some affected youth athletes are prematurely
returned to play resulting in actual or potential physical injury or death to
youth athletes in the state of Washington.”56 The statute then identifies three
primary tools to confront this issue.
First, the statute establishes a guideline that this Note refers to as the
“education tenet.”57 Section 28A.600.190(2) provides:

49. See id. § 28A.600.190(4).
50. See Green, supra note 46.
51. See NFL, NCAA Lobby for Concussion Laws, ESPN (Jan. 12, 2012),
http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/7454729/nfl-ncaa-urge-states-pass-concussion-laws
[https://perma.cc/VT9L-NBUC].
52. See Joe Frollo, Mississippi Becomes 50th State to Pass Youth Sports Concussion Law,
USA FOOTBALL (Jan. 30, 2014), http://web.usafootball.com/blogs/zackery-lystedt/post/8044/
mississippi-becomes-50th-state-to-pass-youth-sports-concussion-law [https://perma.cc/9KW
2-GXJY].
53. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-24-5 (2017).
54. See Kerri McGowan Lowrey, Summary Matrix of State Laws Addressing Concussions
in Youth Sports, NETWORK PUB. HEALTH L. (Mar. 31, 2016), http://www.networkforphl.org/_
asset/7xwh09/Sports-Concussion-Table.pdf (summarizing the legislative steps taken by each
state) [https://perma.cc/DX68-SVP8].
55. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.600.190 (2016).
56. Id. § 28A.600.190(1)(c).
57. See id. § 28A.600.190(2).
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Each school district’s board of directors shall work in concert with the
Washington interscholastic activities association to develop the guidelines
and other pertinent information and forms to inform and educate coaches,
youth athletes, and their parents and/or guardians of the nature and risk of
concussion and head injury including continuing to play after concussion
or head injury. On a yearly basis, a concussion and head injury information
sheet shall be signed and returned by the youth athlete and the athlete’s
parent and/or guardian prior to the youth athlete’s initiating practice or
competition.58

Second, the statute establishes a guideline that this Note labels as the
“removal from play tenet.”59 Section 28A.600.190(3) provides: “A youth
athlete who is suspected of sustaining a concussion or head injury in a
practice or game shall be removed from competition at that time.”60
Third, the statute establishes a guideline that this Note refers to as the
“medical clearance tenet.”61 Section 28A.600.190(4) provides:
A youth athlete who has been removed from play may not return to play
until the athlete is evaluated by a licensed health care provider trained in
the evaluation and management of concussion and receives written
clearance to return to play from that health care provider. The health care
provider may be a volunteer. A volunteer who authorizes a youth athlete
to return to play is not liable for civil damages resulting from any act or
omission in the rendering of such care, other than acts or omissions
constituting gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct.62

These three pillars have served as the foundation for most state youth
concussion laws.63 It is important to note, however, that while the
Washington statute applies only to student athletes in public schools, other
state statutes often extend application to both public and private recreational
leagues.64 The following subsection broadly canvases the scope of state
legislation as a whole, in terms of the tenets that have been adopted and the
extent to which other state statutes reach private leagues.
2. Lystedt as a Barometer
While the Lystedt Law emphasizes three primary tenetseducational
programs, removal from play guidelines, and medical clearance before
returning to playnot all state concussion laws address each of these issues,
and, therefore, significant variations exist between the legal requirements set
forth by each state.65 According to a study conducted by the Network for
58. Id.
59. See id. § 28A.600.190(3).
60. Id.
61. See id. § 28A.600.190(4).
62. Id.
63. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
64. See Douglas E. Abrams, Concussion Safety in Children’s Sports: A Central Role for
the “Power of the Permit,” 10 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 1, 5 (2015) (citing the Arkansas concussion
statute as one that maximizes protection “by regulating both interscholastic play and private
youth sports organizations”).
65. See Lowrey, supra note 54.
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Public Health Law, only thirty statutes mandate concussion education for
coaches, and just twenty-one statutes extend the scope of the law’s coverage
beyond school athletics to nonschool-sponsored youth sports.66 To be sure,
each state has the authority to implement its own variations; this Note does
not suggest otherwise. However, less protective states leave youth athletes
more vulnerable to both the short- and long-term effects of TBI.67
In assessing the relative strength of state laws, it is helpful to use
Washington’s Lystedt Law as a barometer, given that many laws now include
all three Lystedt tenets in some variation.68 In terms of the education tenet,
forty-one states and the District of Columbia require that some form of TBIeducation material be distributed to parents and student athletes.69 Regarding
removal from play, every jurisdiction now requires immediate removal from
play following an actual or suspected concussion.70 As to medical clearance,
forty-six states and the District of Columbia have provisions requiring written
clearance.71 However, the type of medical professional that is required to
provide such clearance varies widely based on the state: some states require
that a medical doctor provide the clearance, whereas other states rely on
athletic trainers and nurses.72 Finally, even where there may be facial
uniformity as to these three tenets, there often is tremendous variation across
states in the application of these laws.73 Part II addresses these discrepancies
in more detail.
II. ADDRESSING THE ISSUE AT THE STATE AND FEDERAL LEVELS
While every American child is now protected to some degree, children in
certain states, like Washington, have been afforded greater protections than
children in other states, like Mississippi.74 In addition, states have received
limited guidance from Congress with regard to how best to protect youth
athletes.75
This part surveys state and, to a lesser extent, federal responses to the
concussion epidemic. Part II.A assesses the different levels of protection that
exist across state youth concussion laws. Next, Part II.B evaluates how these
statutes are enforced both in terms of sanctions and tort liability. Part II.C
66. See id.
67. See Kimberly G. Harmon et al., American Medical Society for Sports Medicine
Position Statement: Concussion in Sport, 23 CLINICAL J. SPORTS MED. 1, 11–12 (2013)
(discussing the short- and long-term risks associated with premature return to play).
68. See Harvey, supra note 14, at 89.
69. See Lowrey, supra note 54.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id.; see also Amanda Cook et al., Where Do We Go from Here?: An Inside Look
into the Development of Georgia’s Youth Concussion Law, 42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 284, 287
(2014) (“[T]he question of who is allowed to evaluate, treat, and provide medical clearance is
an area of big debate when it comes to concussion laws.”).
73. See Lowrey & Morain, supra note 18, at 291 (noting that, particularly in the case of
youth sports concussion laws, “‘law on the streets’ may diverge from ‘law on the books’”).
74. See Green, supra note 46.
75. See Kevin Brandwein, Goals and Obstacles in Legislating Concussion Management
in Youth Sports, 10 WILLAMETTE SPORTS L.J. 28, 53 (2013); infra Part II.C.
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examines the congressional response and Congress’s failure to provide a
uniform national standard. Finally, Part II.D surveys the perspectives of three
academic commentators in terms of how to best increase protection for youth
athletes.
A. Comparing State Statutes: Leaders and Laggards
Using the Lystedt Law as a reference point, this Note sorts state statutes
into five distinct tiers: “Laggards,” “Loafers,” “Lystedters,” “LystedtersPlus,” and “Leaders.” These tiers range from least to most protective,
respectively, in terms of the strength of protections offered to youth
athletes.76 All state statutes match the Lystedt Law’s second tenet of required
removal from play.77 However, beyond that, state laws include varying
levels of protection and differ with regard to the strength of the medical
clearance tenet, the education tenet, whether the training of coaches is
encouraged or required, and whether the statute reaches private recreational
athletics. Each of these differences results in varying levels of protections
offered to youth athletes, which allows this Note to place each state statute
into a distinct tier, as presented below.
1. A Tiered Approach
The Laggards tier includes Georgia,78 Idaho,79 Mississippi,80 and
Wyoming.81 These states offer the least protective youth concussion
statutes.82 While these jurisdictions all require medical clearance of some
sort before an athlete can return to play, they do not require written
clearance.83 This distinction may seem trivial, but written clearance by a
licensed health-care professional offers an added layer of protection for youth
athletes: it ensures that the considerations on which the return-to-play
decisions are made are restricted to medical ones, as opposed to decisions
motivated by a desire to win the game.84 Moreover, requiring the
documentation of medical clearance increases accountability among healthcare professionals and reduces the risk of premature return to play, thereby
decreasing the risk of TBI.85

76. A summary of these tiers is provided below in the appendix.
77. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
78. GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-324.1 (2017).
79. IDAHO CODE § 33-1625 (2017).
80. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-24-5 (2017).
81. WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-2-202(a)(xxxiii), 21-3-110(a)(xxxii) (2017).
82. See Lowrey, supra note 54.
83. See id.
84. See Wilson, supra note 14, at 286 (noting that the requirement of written clearance
aims to relieve coaches, athletic trainers, and parents of having to make the return-to-play
decision).
85. See Elisabeth Koloup, Comment, Get Your Head in the Game: Legislation Addressing
Concussions in Youth Sports and Its Development in Maryland, 42 U. BALT. L.F. 207, 223–24
(2012).
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The Loafers tier includes Colorado,86 Minnesota,87 Missouri,88 New
Hampshire,89 New York,90 South Carolina,91 and Utah.92 These states
provide greater protection than states in the Laggards tier, given that they
require written medical clearance, but they fail to match the full protections
offered by Washington’s Lystedt Law, particularly concerning the education
tenet.93 For example, Missouri, New Hampshire, South Carolina, and Utah
do not require coaches to undergo formal education or training in the
recognition and management of concussions.94 In addition, these four states
do not require a student’s acknowledgement of having received educational
materials before the student’s participation in school-sponsored athletics.95
While Minnesota and New York both require the training of coaches and the
development and publication or distribution of educational materials
regarding TBI safety, these states do not require acknowledgment of receipt
or informed consent from either parents or students before a youth athlete’s
participation.96 Colorado offers even fewer protections than Minnesota and
New York, given that its statute does not expressly require the development
of educational materials.97
The Lystedters tier includes thirteen states, plus the District of Columbia,
which satisfy the three basic tenets of the Lystedt Law.98 All of these states
require education for both parents and student athletes, mandatory removal
from play following a suspected concussion, and written medical clearance
before returning to physical activity.99 These states do not offer any
innovation beyond the protections offered by the three tenets.
The Lystedters-Plus tier includes sixteen states that match the Lystedt
Law’s three basic tenets and require the training of coaches, as opposed to
merely suggesting this.100 For example, while the Lystedt Law requires
86. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-43-103 (2017).
87. MINN. STAT. §§ 121A.37–.38 (2017).
88. MO. REV. STAT. § 167.765 (2016).
89. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 200:49–:52 (2017).
90. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 305(42) (McKinney 2017).
91. S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-63-75 (2016).
92. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 26-53-101 to -102, -201, -301, -401 (West 2016).
93. See Lowrey, supra note 54, at 3, 11–14, 18–19.
94. See id. at 12–13, 18–19.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 22 n.2.
97. See id. at 3.
98. ALASKA STAT. §§ 14.30.142–.143 (2016); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-341(24)(b)
(2016); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49475 (West 2016); D.C. CODE §§ 7-2871.01–.05 (2017); FLA.
STAT. § 1006.20 (2017); IOWA CODE § 280.13C (2016); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-135 (2017);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 71-9101 to -9106 (2016); NEV. REV. STAT. § 385B.080 (2016); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 115C-12.23 (2016); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 24-155 (2017); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1271.5 (2017); WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.600.190 (2016); WIS. STAT. § 118.293 (2017).
99. See Lowrey, supra note 54, at 1–2, 5, 8, 12–15, 20–21.
100. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 10-149b to -149c (2017); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 303 (2017);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 160.445 (West 2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 222 (2017); MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-1301 to -1304 (2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:40-41.1 to -41.7 (West
2017); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-13-31 (2017); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15.1-18.2-04 (2017); 24 PA.
CONS. STAT. §§ 5322–5323 (2016); 16 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 16-91-1 to -4 (2016); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS §§ 13-36-4 to -14 (2017); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 38.151–.160 (West 2015); VT.
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coaches to receive an annual concussion and head injury information sheet,
it does not require coaches to complete concussion-specific education or
training.101 By contrast, Texas requires that each coach complete the state’s
“safety training program” developed by the commissioner of education.102
This safety training program requires coaches to receive training in
emergency action planning and in the recognition of “head and neck injuries,
concussions, [and] injuries related to second impact syndrome.”103 The
nature of a concussion requires those charged with supervising players to
recognize external symptoms.104 This suggests that states that require
holistic and inclusive training programs for coaches are more effective than
those where the education tenet merely requires the distribution of an
information sheet.
Finally, the Leaders tier includes Alabama,105 Arkansas,106 Illinois,107
Indiana,108 Louisiana,109 Maryland,110 Michigan,111 Ohio,112 Oregon,113 and
Tennessee.114 These states satisfy the Lystedt Law’s three basic tenets,
require training for coaches and add an extra layer of protection by extending
to both public school athletics and private recreational sports.115 For
example, Arkansas’s law expressly applies to any organized athletic activity
in which the participants, a majority of whom are under nineteen years of
age, are engaged in an athletic game or competition “against another team,
club, or entity,” or in practice or preparation for such a game.116 By
expanding the scope of the law’s reach beyond public schools, states in the
Leaders tier are able to protect more of their youth athletes.117
2. Strengths of State Legislation
Because of the grave effects of concussions on our youth, current state
laws merely represent a starting point for youth concussion reforms.118
STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1431 (2016); W. VA. CODE § 18-2-25a (2016); see also 2012 Haw. Sess.
Laws 197; 2012 Me. Laws 688.
101. See WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.600.190(2).
102. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 33.202(a)–(b). The title of the statute, “Safety Training
Required,” makes clear that the training requirement for coaches is mandatory. Id.
103. See id. § 33.202(c)(2)(D).
104. See supra Part I.A.
105. ALA. CODE § 22-11E-2 (2017).
106. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 6-18-708, -710 (2017).
107. 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/22-80 (2016).
108. IND. CODE §§ 20-34-7-1 to -6 (2016).
109. LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1089.1–.5 (2016).
110. MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-433 (West 2017).
111. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 333.9155–.9156 (2016).
112. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.539 (West 2016).
113. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 336.485, 417.875 (2016).
114. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 68-55-501 to -503 (2016).
115. See Lowrey, supra note 54, at 1–2, 7–10, 15–16, 19.
116. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-710(a)(1) (2017).
117. See Abrams, supra note 64, at 8 (“A concussion is a concussion, regardless of whether
a boy or girl sustains it in interscholastic play or in a private youth league.”).
118. See Howard Fendrich & Eddie Pells, AP Analysis: Youth Concussion Laws
Pushed by NFL Lack Bite, AP (Jan. 28, 2015), http://pro32.ap.org/article/ap-analysis-youth-
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Therefore, to improve future legislation, it is vital to evaluate the strengths
and weaknesses across the spectrum of state legislation. Washington’s
Lystedt Law and laws that emulate it have succeeded in requiring that any
athlete suspected of having sustained a TBI must be immediately removed
from action and cannot be returned to play until receiving clearance from a
medical professional.119 While this may seem relatively modest, this
mandate expressly removes the return-to-play decision from coaches,
players, and parentsactors who may be driven primarily by a desire to
winand instead assigns the decision to a medical professional, whose
interests are more likely to be aligned with the safety of the youth athlete.120
This medical clearance mandate also reduces the risk of second impact
syndrome.121 In addition, state laws have succeeded in increasing awareness
among coaches, players, and parents through the use of informed consent and
training requirements.122 While state statutes vary in terms of how informed
consent is obtained and how educational trainings are conducted, there can
be no doubt that these laws have made key decision makers more
knowledgeable regarding the risks of TBI.123
3. Weaknesses of State Legislation
While the Lystedt Law and its progeny have provided greater protections
to student athletes, these laws have generally been marked by four primary
shortcomings. First, many state concussion laws are vaguely worded,
particularly regarding the informed consent and education requirements.124
This has allowed some states, particularly those in the Laggards125 and
Loafers126 tiers, to follow the letter of the law without achieving their

concussion-laws-pushed-nfl-lack-bite-0 [https://perma.cc/R82C-ZXU6]. In reference to the
shortcomings of particular state statutes, NFL Senior Vice President of Health and Safety
Policy Jeff Miller stated, “We did make compromises . . . . Better to get something good, and
get something in place, as opposed to shoot for something fantastic in all placesand fail.”
Id.
119. See WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.600.190(3)–(4) (2016); Harvey, supra note 14, at 92–
93.
120. See Brandwein, supra note 75, at 49 (noting that medical professionals are likely to
err on the side of caution, given that these professionals are generally motivated by an “oath,
respect for the risks inherent in a head injury, genuine concern for the student, or fear of a
malpractice suit”).
121. See id. at 53.
122. See Harvey, supra note 14, at 93.
123. See Brandwein, supra note 75, at 49 (“These types of rule changes demonstrate
awareness surrounding head injuries, which have led to a reduction in the concussion risks
associated with competition.”).
124. See Lesley Lueke, Comment, High School Athletes and Concussions, 32 J. LEGAL
MED. 483, 495 (2011).
125. See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text.
126. For example, the laws in Minnesota and New York require that educational
information or materials be developed, distributed, or made accessible, but these laws do not
require acknowledgment of receipt or informed consent prior to a youth athlete’s participation
in sports. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. While such information might be posted
on a school district’s website, it does not necessarily mean that the information has actually
been read by youth athletes.
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statutes’ intended purpose.127 Second, many state statutes apply only to
public school districts and organizations that utilize public school
facilities.128 As a result, children enrolled in private schools and children
who play for private recreational teams, such as Pop Warner football teams129
and travel soccer clubs, are often unprotected.130 When states choose to
protect only youth athletes in public schools, it signals that the state
legislature is more concerned with the cost of enforcement than any
justification grounded in health or safety.131 Third, state statutes have failed
to provide strong enforcement mechanisms.132 Specifically, few states
impose penalties on coaches or school districts that fail to comply with the
statute.133 Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, existing youth sports TBI
laws focus primarily on reducing the secondary effects of concussions as
opposed to attacking their primary causes, such as in-sport maneuvers.134
While it is important to protect children after they have sustained TBIs, it is
equally if not more important to prevent the TBI from occurring in the first
instance. Each of these issues is exacerbated by the failure of almost all states
to develop a system to track individual athletes and thereby evaluate the
effectiveness of their laws.135 A better understanding of these weaknesses,
particularly in terms of quantifiable data,136 would help state legislatures
strengthen youth concussion legislation.
B. Enforcement of State Legislation
While there are significant variations across states in terms of the basic
adopted tenets, there is also a wide gap in how these laws are enforced.137
This is due, in part, to the fact that Washington’s Lystedt Law is largely silent
on the issue of enforcement.138 In fact, the only language relevant to
enforcement is a provision seeking to immunize volunteers from civil

127. See Lueke, supra note 124, at 495.
128. Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-341(24)(b) (2016) (limiting coverage to
organizations that utilize public school facilities), with ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-710(a) (2017)
(extending statutory coverage to all youth athletic activities).
129. Pop Warner is a national nonprofit organization that provides youth football,
cheerleading, and dance programs.
130. See Wilson, supra note 14, at 285.
131. But see Abrams, supra note 64, at 8–11 (noting that when legislatures extend
protections to private youth organizations that use public facilities, the change is “unlikely to
impose significant fiscal constraints”).
132. See Phoebe Anne Amberg, Comment, Protecting Kids’ Melons: Potential Liability
and Enforcement Issues with Youth Concussion Laws, 23 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 171, 183
(2012).
133. See id.; see also infra Part II.B.
134. See Wilson, supra note 14, at 248, 255; see also Harmon et al., supra note 67, at 2–3,
13 (differentiating between “primary” and “secondary” prevention).
135. See Harvey, supra note 14, at 104–05.
136. See id. at 97 (citing Rhode Island as a state that has introduced successful policy
experimentation in the form of baseline testing before the beginning of every sports season,
which will provide useful data metrics and clarify areas of scientific ambiguity).
137. See Lowrey & Morain, supra note 18, at 296 (noting that many states have established
“little to no formal enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance”).
138. See WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.600.190 (2016).
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liability.139 Thus, although most states have followed the Lystedt Law’s
three primary tenets, state enforcement mechanismsan area where the
Lystedt Law is restrainedhave generally lacked uniformity. Today, when
a youth athlete suffers a TBI, there are two primary modes of recourse against
coaches and school districts held to be in violation of the statute: (1) express
statutory sanctions, where applicable, and (2) tort liability.140
1. Statutory Sanctions
In an effort to improve enforcement, some state legislatures have expressly
imposed sanctions on coaches and school districts that fail to adhere to the
statutory mandate.141 These provisions aim to limit any incentive that a
coach may have to keep a youth athlete in the game after suffering a TBI.142
Currently, such sanctions exist in only a handful of states. In Connecticut,
for instance, the State Board of Education may revoke a coaching permit from
“any coach found to be in violation” of the statute.143 In Massachusetts, a
school that fails to comply with the statute, as determined by the
Massachusetts Department of Public Health, “shall be subject to penalties as
determined by the department.”144
The Pennsylvania state statute provides the most specific statutory
sanctions of any state. In Pennsylvania, the governing body of a school is
required to suspend a coach for the remainder of the season if the coach fails
to properly remove a student athlete from play.145 Upon a second violation,
the coach will be suspended for the remainder of the current season and for
the following season.146 And if a coach violates the statute a third time, she
will receive a “permanent suspension from coaching any athletic activity.”147
Given that these sanctions incentivize coaches to take added precautions
when a youth athlete appears to suffer a TBI, it is unclear why the vast
majority of states have failed to implement similar provisions.148 The best
explanation, perhaps, is that such a provision would overexpose coaches to
punishment and lead to unwarranted lawsuits.149 This hypothesis is
supported by the fact that many states expressly immunize their coaches from
liability.150 For example, concussion legislation in Texas provides express
139. See id. § 28A.600.190(4) (“A volunteer who authorizes a youth athlete to return to
play is not liable for civil damages resulting from any act or omission in the rendering of such
care, other than acts or omissions constituting gross negligence or willful or wanton
misconduct.”).
140. See Harvey, supra note 14, at 97–98.
141. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-149b(f) (2017); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5323(f)
(2016).
142. See Harvey, supra note 14, at 97.
143. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-149b(f).
144. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 222(e) (2017).
145. 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5323(f)(1).
146. Id. § 5323(f)(2).
147. Id. § 5323(f)(3).
148. See Harvey, supra note 14, at 97.
149. See Koloup, supra note 85, at 224 (noting that such a provision, if enacted, could have
a potentially “chilling effect on coaching”).
150. See infra Part II.B.2.b.

2017]

LEADERS AND LAGGARDS

2895

immunity to school district officials or employees, emergency responders,
and members of the concussion oversight team.151 Given that relatively few
states expressly impose penalties on coaches who fail to adhere to the letter
of the law, many parents of injured youth athletes have turned to tort liability
as a means of civil recourse.152
2. The Unsettled Role of Tort Law
When a youth athlete who has suffered a TBI is prematurely permitted to
return to play, parents of the injured player may bring a civil lawsuit against
the player’s coaches and the school district as the coaches’ employer.153
However, most state concussion statutes do not expressly provide a cause of
action.154 For example, Washington’s Lystedt Law does not,155 and
Washington state courts have held that, in light of this silence, there is no
implied cause of action.156 Moreover, other state statutes expressly dictate
that a cause of action is not provided.157 As a result, when a parent initiates
a suit against a coach or school district, it tends to be based on common law
negligence.158
a. Common Law Negligence
Return-to-play lawsuits, primarily premised on a tort claim of negligence,
often allege that the coaches have failed to either properly identify or manage
a concussion.159 To prevail, a plaintiff must prove the basic elements of
common law negligence: the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care, the
defendant breached that duty of care and exposed the plaintiff to the risk of a
substantial loss or damages, the breach was both the actual and proximate
cause of the harm, and the plaintiff suffered a pecuniary loss or injury as a
consequence.160 In cases where a youth athlete has suffered a TBI, a breach
of the duty of care may arise when a coach prematurely allows the athlete to
return to play.161 In addition, plaintiffs often claim that school districts are
vicariously liable for the negligence of a coach under their supervision.162
However, as discussed below, there are certain roadblocks that often obstruct
common law negligence suits.
151. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 38.159 (West 2015).
152. See Perry A. Zirkel, Court Decisions Specific to Public School Responses to Student
Concussions, 35 PHYSICAL DISABILITIES, no. 1, 2016, at 3.
153. See Wilson, supra note 14, at 268.
154. See Dionne L. Koller, Putting Public Law into “Private” Sport, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 681,
718 (2016).
155. See supra notes 138–39 and accompanying text.
156. See Swank v. Valley Christian Sch., 374 P.3d 245 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016) (holding
that Washington’s Lystedt Law does not create an implied cause of action).
157. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 118.293(6) (2017) (“This section does not create any liability
for, or a cause of action against, any person.”).
158. See Wilson, supra note 14, at 259–60.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 260.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 261.
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b. Immunity Provisions
Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, a public school board, as a state
agent, may be immunized from vicarious liability for the negligence of its
employees.163 In addition, coaches, as employees of a state agent, may also
receive qualified immunity.164 This immunity defense varies from state to
state and depends on the provisions in the relevant concussion statute.165 In
fact, twenty-five jurisdictions have enacted youth sports legislation
attempting to limit liability for school districts, coaches, volunteers, or
health-care providers who might face lawsuits in the wake of a TBI-related
event.166 Like the Lystedt Law, many of these state statutes provide
exemptions from liability, except in cases of gross negligence or willful or
wanton misconduct.167 A typical statute provides that, so long as a school
employee or coach can prove that her conduct was made in good faith and in
compliance with the law and “local school board policies relative to the
management of concussions and head injuries,” she will receive immunity
from liability.168
c. Fourteenth Amendment Claims
Due to this varying pattern of immunity across states,169 and because an
immunity defense often blocks claims of common law negligence, the
parents of injured youth athletes often assert claims under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.170 Specifically, these plaintiffs allege
that public actors created a danger to the bodily integrity or physical safety
of a student in their charge.171 This standard is frequently referred to as the
“state-created danger theory.”172 To succeed on this claim against a coach,
a plaintiff must show that the coach’s conduct was at least deliberately
indifferent to the student’s safety such that it “shocks the conscience.”173 To
succeed on a claim against a school district, a plaintiff must show that a
certain practice or custom, ratified by the school district, causally connects to
the coach’s deliberately indifferent conduct.174 In these types of return-to163. See Zirkel, supra note 152, at 3.
164. Qualified immunity “balances two important intereststhe need to hold public
officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials
from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson
v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
165. See Koller, supra note 154, at 718.
166. See Harvey, supra note 14, at 97.
167. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 118.293 (2017) (“Any athletic coach, official involved in an
athletic activity, or volunteer who fails to remove a person from a youth athletic activity . . . is
immune from civil liability for any injury resulting from that omission unless it constitutes
gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct.”).
168. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200:51 (2017).
169. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
170. See Zirkel, supra note 152, at 3.
171. See id.
172. See id. at 6–7.
173. See id. (noting that this standard “poses a rather steep slope to establish liability”).
174. See id. at 6.
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play cases, court decisions across states have largely favored school district
defendants; however, case law on this issue is unsettled.175
d. Case Law Is Far from Crystallized
Given that return-to-play cases have only begun to emerge in recent years,
it is still not entirely clear, even within a single state, when a civil lawsuit
will result in liability, no liability, or a settlement agreement.176
Pennsylvaniaparticularly its federal courtshas served as a forum for
several return-to-play cases and provides an illuminating example of this
uncertainty.177
In M.U. v. Downingtown High School East,178 the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania found for the defendant-coach and defendant-school district
where the parents of an injured high school soccer player brought claims
against the coach and school district, alleging violations of both common law
negligence and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.179 The
parents alleged that the coach negligently failed to remove their daughter
from the game after she was struck on the head by another player.180 The
parents also alleged that the school district failed to implement proper
policies regarding concussion evaluation and that this failure amounted to a
violation of their daughter’s constitutional rights.181 The court dismissed the
negligence claims against the coach based on Pennsylvania’s provision of
governmental immunity.182 The negligence claim did not fit within any of
the limited exceptions to the immunity provision.183 Further, the court
granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the Fourteenth Amendment due
process claim, holding that the plaintiffs had failed to allege facts sufficient
to show deliberate indifference by the coach.184
The decision in Mann v. Palmerton Area School District,185 in which the
Middle District of Pennsylvania sided with the plaintiff-parents, presents a

175. See id. at 14.
176. Compare M.U. v. Downingtown High Sch. E., 103 F. Supp. 3d 612, 634 (E.D. Pa.
2015) (granting the coach’s motion to dismiss the Fourteenth Amendment due process claim
and also granting the coach’s motion to dismiss the common law negligence claim, where a
youth athlete suffered a TBI), with Mann v. Palmerton Area Sch. Dist., 33 F. Supp. 3d 530,
543 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (denying the district’s motion to dismiss the Fourteenth Amendment due
process claim, where a youth athlete suffered a TBI).
177. Pennsylvania is a popular forum for these types of cases due to its applicable immunity
provisions, its emphasis on interscholastic athletics, and its relatively high rate of education
litigation. Zirkel, supra note 152, at 6.
178. 103 F. Supp. 3d 612 (E.D. Pa. 2015).
179. Id. at 616–18.
180. Id. at 617. The parents further alleged that the coach ignored the advice of their
daughter’s teammate and the opposing coach, who both advised that the player should be
removed from the game for medical evaluation. Id.
181. Id. at 616–17.
182. Id. at 630; see supra note 164 and accompanying text.
183. See Zirkel, supra note 152, at 5.
184. See Downingtown, 103 F. Supp. 3d at 624.
185. 33 F. Supp. 3d 530 (M.D. Pa. 2014).

2898

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

different outcome.186 In Mann, the parents of an injured high school football
player brought a claim against the coaches and school district, alleging
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause under the
state-created danger theory.187 The parents alleged that the coaches told their
son to continue practicing after their son collided with a teammate, without
first providing proper medical evaluation.188 The parents claimed that the
school district failed to implement proper policies regarding concussion
evaluation and that this failure constituted a state-created danger.189 Here,
the court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the Fourteenth
Amendment claim.190 In contrast with Downingtown, the court held that the
plaintiffs successfully alleged facts that showed the coaches’ deliberate
indifference and that the school district failed to train coaches on proper
safety protocol.191 In each case, at least one member of the coaching staff
was aware of the hit suffered by the player but failed to remove the player
from participation.192 Yet, with regard to the Fourteenth Amendment claims,
This difference in
the respective courts adopted different views.193
outcomes is indicative of the inconsistencies that exist across jurisdictions in
the enforcement of youth sports concussion legislation.194
3. Enforcement Is a Major Area of Weakness
As discussed above, state youth concussion laws have established
relatively few enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance with the
186. Id. at 530.
187. Id. at 535. The parents argued that their claim against the coaches satisfied the four
elements required to state a claim under § 1983 for a state-created danger that violated their
child’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Id. at 537 (“(1) [T]he harm ultimately
caused was foreseeable and fairly direct; (2) a state actor acted with a degree of culpability
that shocks the conscience; (3) a relationship between the state and the plaintiff existed such
that the plaintiff was a foreseeable victim of the defendant’s acts or a member of a discrete
class of persons subjected to the potential harm brought about by the state’s actions as opposed
to a member of the public in general; and (4) a state actor affirmatively used his or her authority
in a way that created a danger to the citizen or that rendered the citizen more vulnerable to
danger than had the state not acted at all.” (quoting Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 304–05
(3d Cir. 2006))). Consistent with these four elements, the parents alleged that the coaches (1)
should have known that traumatic brain injuries were a common hazard of football; (2) told
the player to continue practicing despite the fact that the player sustained substantial hits to
the head in the open view of trainers and coaches; (3) shared such a relationship with the
player; and (4) “personally observed [the player’s] disoriented disposition yet acted in
deliberate indifference to his health, safety and welfare by placing him back into practice.” Id.
at 537–41.
188. Id. at 534.
189. Id. at 535.
190. Id. at 540.
191. Id. at 541–42.
192. M.U. v. Downingtown High Sch. E., 103 F. Supp. 3d, 612, 617 (E.D. Pa. 2015); Mann,
33 F. Supp. 3d at 534.
193. See supra notes 184, 190 and accompanying text.
194. Compare Croce v. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist., No. 13-6831, 2015 WL 1565834 (E.D.
Pa. Apr. 8, 2015) (holding in favor of the defendant-school district), and Ripple v. Marble
Falls Indep. Sch. Dist., 99 F. Supp. 3d 662 (W.D. Tex. 2015) (holding in favor of the
defendant-school district), with Alt v. Shirey, No. 11-468, 2012 WL 726593 (W.D. Pa. Mar.
1, 2012) (holding in favor of the plaintiff-parents with regard to the due process claim).
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statutory mandate.195 As a result, many of these state statutes lack sufficient
teeth.196 Because many statutes are silent concerning enforcement
procedures, and some even include immunity provisions for coaches and
health-care professionals, there is little accountability for failing to manage
youth concussions as required.197 This concern is not new. When
Washington’s Lystedt Law was enacted in 2009, one Washington senator
voted against it citing concerns about who would be held liable for deciding
whether to remove athletes from play.198 One reason, perhaps, why state
legislatures have failed to enact tighter enforcement mechanisms may be the
longstanding notion of minimal government involvement in sports.199 In
addition, there remains a concern of overexposing coaches and health-care
providers to liability; if enforcement measures are too harsh, they may deter
adults from entering these important roles.200 However, to ensure adequate
protections moving forward, many commentators believe that state
legislatures should begin to strike a balance between protecting against
unwarranted lawsuits while also establishing accountability for proper
concussion management.201
C. Federal Law Lags: Failed Attempts at Reform
As discussed in Parts II.A and II.B, the primary focus of this Note is state
legislation and the disparity that exists across states in terms of the
protections afforded to youth athletes. With that in mind, it is important to
briefly address Congress’s failed attempts at developing and implementing
comprehensive youth concussion legislation. By understanding why certain
federal bills have failed, state legislators can add to their evolving knowledge
of concussion care and management.
Since the enactment of the Lystedt Law, the federal government has failed
to enact each concussion bill that has come to the floor.202 In 2010 alone,
two federal bills were introduced but failed to pass.203 The first bill, the
Concussion Treatment and Care Tools Act of 2010 (ConTACT), passed in

195. See supra note 137.
196. See Koller, supra note 154, at 718 (noting that existing concussion statutes have been
described as “legally ineffective”).
197. See Lueke, supra note 124, at 494–96.
198. See Anderson, supra note 4 (noting State Senator Bob Morton’s concern that the
proposed law did not adequately address consequences for those who disobeyed the rule).
199. See Koller, supra note 154, at 719.
200. See Kevin Grier & Tyler Cowen, What Would the End of Football Look Like?,
GRANTLAND (Feb. 13, 2012), http://grantland.com/features/cte-concussion-crisis-economiclook-end-football (“If ex-players start winning judgments, . . . [c]oaches, team physicians, and
referees would become increasingly nervous about their financial exposure in our litigious
society.”) [https://perma.cc/27SU-DCPE].
201. See, e.g., Koller, supra note 154, at 730–31; Lueke, supra note 124, at 499–500;
Wilson, supra note 14, at 288–91.
202. See Koller, supra note 154, at 713–15 (noting that, as of 2016, federal legislation has
been proposed but not yet enacted); Lueke, supra note 124, at 491.
203. See Lueke, supra note 124, at 491–92.
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the House of Representatives but never reached the Senate floor.204 With the
stated goal of establishing a national standard, ConTACT would have
required computerized baseline and postinjury testing for school-aged
children, an aspect that most state laws lack.205 This initiative would have
been funded with federal grants.206
The second bill that similarly failed, the Protecting Student Athletes from
Concussions Act of 2010 (PSACA I), would have required state agencies to
issue regulations concerning concussion prevention and treatment.207 Under
the act, these agencies would have received federal funding for enacting
certain benchmark rules.208 PSACA I also would have included provisions
requiring academic accommodations for students suffering from recent
concussions.209 However, PSACA I never left committee, and when it was
reintroduced in 2011 as PSACA II, it again failed to move beyond the
committee stage.210
In 2013, Congress made another attempt at national reform with the
introduction of the Youth Sports Concussion Act of 2013.211 This act
targeted the safety of sporting equipment by providing oversight of
equipment manufacturers.212 More specifically, it authorized the Consumer
Products Safety Commission to set standards for certain products,
particularly sports-related protective equipment.213 Violations of these
standards were to be treated as unfair or deceptive practices under the Federal
Trade Commission Act.214 However, like its predecessors, the bill died in
committee.215 The act was reintroduced in February of 2016 but died at the
end of the 114th Congress’s term in January of 2017.216

204. H.R. 1347 (111th): Concussion Treatment and Care Tools Act of 2010, GOVTRACK,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr1347 (last visited Apr. 14, 2017) [https://
perma.cc/K96A-D9SK].
205. Concussion Treatment and Care Tools Act of 2010, H.R. 1347, 111th Cong.
§ 317U(b)(1)(C) (2010).
206. See id. § 317U(b)(2).
207. Protecting Student Athletes from Concussions Act of 2010, H.R. 6172, 111th Cong.
§ 3 (2010).
208. See id.
209. See id. § 3(1)(B).
210. H.R. 469 (112th): Protecting Student Athletes from Concussions Act of 2011,
GOVTRACK, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr469 (last visited Apr. 14, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/AMV8-BGQV]; H.R. 6172 (111th): Protecting Student Athletes from
Concussions Act of 2010, GOVTRACK, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr6172 (last
visited Apr. 14, 2017) [https://perma.cc/6GU7-JKF7].
211. H.R. 2118, 113th Cong. (2013).
212. See id. § 3(a)(2).
213. See id.
214. See id. § 4(b)(1).
215. H.R. 2118 (113th):
Youth Sports Concussion Act of 2013, GOVTRACK,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr2118 (last visited Apr. 14, 2017) [https://
perma.cc/MQ7L-ZDC6].
216. H.R. 4460 (114th):
Youth Sports Concussion Act, GOVTRACK,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr4460 (last visited Apr. 14, 2017) [https://
perma.cc/SFX9-TBQS].
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D. Academic Perspectives
Given that the Lystedt Law was not enacted until 2009 and federal
concussion legislation is still in its infancy, youth sports concussion law
represents an emerging area of law. Moreover, because this issue involves
the health and safety of children, this area has attracted an increasing amount
of attention from both lawmakers and academic commentators.217 The
previous sections of Part II examined the legislative response to the
concussion epidemic. Part II.D assesses the issue from an academic
perspective. In particular, Part II.D surveys the perspectives of three leading
commentators: Marie-France Wilson, Hosea H. Harvey, and Kerri
McGowan Lowrey. It is important to differentiate between primary risks, the
root causes of TBI, and secondary risks, the effects after TBI.218 This is a
distinction that Wilson, Harvey, and Lowrey each emphasize in their analyses
of existing youth concussion legislation.
Marie-France Wilson contends that while state youth concussion
legislation is a positive development, it is not a complete answer to the
problem, because, at best, such measures can only reduce, not eliminate,
sports-related TBIs.219 In response to the ongoing issue, Wilson encourages
a “trickle-down effect,” where policies adopted at professional levels
influence those intended to protect young athletes.220 For example, Wilson
points to rule changesspecifically rules regarding body checking in ice
hockeyas preventative measures that can potentially reduce the incidence
of concussions.221 In 2010, in response to growing concerns about TBIs, the
National Hockey League (NHL) implemented new rules that prohibited hits
to the head.222 Subsequently, due to growing concerns on the part of the
NHL and new scientific studies that pointed to the dangers of body checking
at a young age, the Canadian Academy of Sports Medicine and the American
Academy of Pediatrics recommended limits on body checking at the youth
level.223 Therefore, changes in behavior and attitudes toward concussions at
the youth level may be fostered by similar changes at the professional
level.224
While Wilson focuses mainly on the primary prevention of TBIs through
rule changes and subsequent behavioral changes, she also recommends
certain secondary measures aimed at protecting youth athletes after they have
suffered a concussion.225 In light of the “patch-work quilt” of reforms that
217. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 14, at 248 (“There is an increased public awareness
respecting the threat posed by sports-related concussions, particularly in young athletes. The
resulting concern of the general public and, perhaps more important, of parents has put
increasing pressure on governments, sport organizations, and their governing bodies to take
preventative steps . . . .”).
218. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
219. Wilson, supra note 14, at 242.
220. Id. at 243.
221. Id. at 250–51.
222. Id. at 252.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 253–55.
225. Id. at 256–60, 283–87.
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have been set forth across state lines, Wilson calls for a uniform set of
guidelinesproposed by a panel of medical expertsmandated by federal
and state legislation.226 The absence of such guidelines, to date, is
representative of the failure of legislatures and national sports governing
bodies to adequately address the threats posed by sports-related TBIs.227
Moving forward, a uniform set of guidelines would raise the standard of care
provided to youth athletes,228 help medical professionals avoid liability,229
and heighten awareness concerning the risk of youth concussions.230 In turn,
professional sports leagues should endorse these uniform guidelines to
encourage their adoption.231
Like Wilson, Hosea H. Harvey also distinguishes between primary and
secondary risks. Harvey argues that existing youth concussion legislation
has been shaped by a dominant interest group with questionable motives, the
NFL; thus, existing youth TBI laws overemphasize prevention of secondary
rather than primary prevention.232 As a result, Harvey believes that current
state laws will likely fail to significantly reduce the overall rate of TBIs in
youth sports.233 According to Harvey, alternative policy and public health
measures may offer more meaningful solutions.234 Specifically, Harvey calls
for direct interventions in particular sportsincluding equipment
improvements and rule changesand emphasizes the importance of policies
created by professional and independent associations.235 Despite his
criticism of the NFL, Harvey points to specific rule changes implemented by
the league in 2011 and 2013 that were specifically intended to reduce
TBIs.236 Pop Warner subsequently crafted new policies to limit contact
during football practices and increase concussion awareness among
participants.237 According to Harvey, state legislatures should not ignore the
policies created by independent associations like Pop Warner.238

226. Id. at 257, 291; see also Taylor Adams, Comment, The Repercussions of Concussions
in Youth Football Leagues: An Analysis of Texas’s Concussion Law and Why Reform Is
Necessary, 18 SCHOLAR 285, 291 (2016) (“[A] uniform standard applicable to every child
would ensure all youth athletes receive the same protection under the law.”).
227. Wilson, supra note 14, at 257.
228. Id. at 275.
229. Id. at 280.
230. Id. at 268.
231. Id. at 290.
232. Harvey, supra note 14, at 71, 89–90.
233. Id. at 104–05.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 111–12.
236. Id. at 108, 111. In 2011, the NFL began requiring that a certified athletic trainer be
present at every game to more effectively monitor the incidence of concussions. Memo
Explains Policy to Have Trainers Monitor for Concussions, NFL (July 26, 2012, 8:52 PM),
http://www.nfl.com/news/story/09000d5d82547e65/article/memo-explains-policy-to-havetrainersmonitor-for-concussions [https://perma.cc/TU8Q-9BXX]. Further, in 2013, the league
began penalizing players who engaged in tackling by leading with the crowns of their helmets.
Harvey, supra note 14, at 108 n.166.
237. Harvey, supra note 14, at 111–12.
238. Id. at 112; see also Josh Hunsucker, Comment, Buckle Your Chinstrap: Why Youth,
High School, and College Football Should Adopt the NFL’s Concussion Management Policies
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In addition to implementing primary prevention measures, Harvey also
calls for improved procedures to reduce the secondary risks of TBI. Here,
Harvey encourages states to implement measures to allow them to better
evaluate the effectiveness of their laws: baseline testing, mandatory tracking
of individual students, and aggregate reporting of data.239 Harvey
acknowledges that, absent partnerships with the CDC and universities, the
financial burden of these reforms is daunting for increasingly cost-conscious
states.240 Thus, Harvey suggests two alternative measures. First, states
should adopt anonymous reporting systems so that parents, athletes, and other
officials can blow the whistle when TBI-prevention mandates are not being
followed.241 Second, and perhaps most crucially, states must break free from
the NFL’s regulatory capture and engage in independent legislative
debates.242
Like Harvey, Kerri McGowan Lowrey asserts that state legislatures should
continue to expand the protections offered to youth athletes by strengthening
existing legislation. Lowrey emphasizes that many states have revised their
laws since initial passage and that these amendments are leading indicators
of future policymaking.243 Lowrey argues that as policymaking continues
the trend of increasing protections, state legislatures should take aim at
improving both primary and secondary prevention.244 Changes to existing
laws have focused on expanding coverage to private recreational sports and
tightening existing requirements according to best practices.245 Moving
forward, states that have not already undertaken these measures will likely
expand the reach of their laws to include recreational youth sports and schoolbased athletics in middle and elementary schools.246 In addition, as state
legislatures learn lessons from implementation and new research
developments, many states will likely strengthen the specific protections
within their existing statutes.247
While these measures will help reduce the secondary risks of TBI, Lowrey
argues that “perhaps the most promising development is the emphasis on
primary prevention” through safer rules of play, mandated limits on physical
and Procedures, 45 MCGEORGE L. REV. 801, 832 (2014) (noting that high schools should
follow the example set by Pop Warner of limiting contact at the lower levels of youth football).
239. Harvey, supra note 14, at 105–07.
240. Id. at 105–06.
241. Id. at 110; see also Andrew B. Carrabis, Head Hunters: The Rise of Neurological
Concussions in American Football and Its Legal Implications, 2 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L.
371, 386 (2011) (“[T]here needs to be a policy which allows a whistleblower to report
anonymously when staff or doctors pressure players to play and violate policy.”).
242. See Harvey, supra note 14, at 113.
243. Kerri M. Lowrey, State Laws Addressing Youth Sports-Related Traumatic Brain
Injury and the Future of Concussion Law and Policy, 10 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 61, 66–67 (2015).
244. Id. at 67–68.
245. Id. at 66.
246. Id.; see also Christine M. Baugh et al., Requiring Athletes to Acknowledge Receipt of
Concussion-Related Information and Responsibility to Report Symptoms: A Study of the
Prevalence, Variation, and Possible Improvements, 42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 297, 299, 303–04
(2014) (discussing which state laws apply to elementary school children and which state laws
apply to nonschool sports leagues).
247. Lowrey, supra note 243, at 67.
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contact, and further regulating sporting equipment.248 For instance,
Massachusetts law prohibits coaches from encouraging or allowing a youth
athlete to engage in unreasonably dangerous techniques, such as helmet-tohelmet hits in football.249 In addition, the California State Legislature has
limited full-contact football practices to twice per week and has stipulated
that the full-contact portion of a practice cannot exceed ninety minutes in a
given day.250 Finally, Texas laws now establish age and reconditioning
standards for helmets in school football programs.251 With respect to these
primary prevention initiatives, Lowrey encourages other states to follow
suit.252
III. FUTURE POLICYMAKING:
CONFRONTING TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY
BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER IMPACT
As Part II discussed, existing youth sports concussion legislation tends to
focus on reducing the secondary effects of concussions after the injury has
already occurred rather than addressing the primary risks, the root causes of
the injury.253 This has occurred, in part, due to lobbying and regulatory
capture by the NFL.254 To adequately protect youth athletes, legislation must
target both risks. Primary prevention of at least some injuries is possible via
the modification of existing rules of play and subsequent changes in attitudes
and behaviors.255 Improved secondary prevention, on the other hand, is
attainable through enhanced TBI assessment and management.256
This part argues that state legislatures have provided a useful framework
to begin addressing the concussion epidemic, but the existing framework
does not represent the end goal. Part III.A asserts that to enhance protections
for all children, legislation in all states requires increased policy innovation,
stronger enforcement mechanisms, and more evaluative metrics at the state
level. Next, Part III.B concludes that beyond just addressing the ex post
effects of TBI, additional legislative mandates are required to address the
problem ex ante: future efforts should place greater emphasis on preventing
the initial injury. Based on these recommendations, Part III.C suggests
provisions to be included in a new model statute. Finally, Part III.D briefly
notes that the adoption of a new model statute will require incentivizing state
legislatures to act.

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Id.
Id. at 67–68 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 222 (2014)).
Id. at 68 (citing CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49475 (West 2014)).
Id. (citing TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 33.094 (West 2012)).
Id. at 71–72.
See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 224, 234–36 and accompanying text.
See Harmon et al., supra note 67, at 2–3.

2017]

LEADERS AND LAGGARDS

2905

A. Addressing Secondary Risks:
Confronting the Issue After Impact
The Lystedt Law defined the problem of youth concussions in a very
narrow manner. The statute emphasized return-to-play guidelines only after
a concussion occurs.257 As a result, the basic tenets of the law underscored
the importance of secondary prevention measures but remained silent on the
issue of primary prevention.258 Moving forward, state legislatures must
begin to address these primary risks. However, it is also important that state
laws continue to expand the scope of secondary measures.259 More
specifically, future lawmaking should broaden the scope of coverage to
include all youth athletes, strengthen enforcement mechanisms, and enact
feedback procedures for states to assess the effectiveness of their statutes.
1. Expanding Coverage and Strengthening Enforcement
By merely emulating the Lystedt Law, many state legislatures have failed
to innovate in the protections they provide to youth athletes.260 However, in
the post-Lystedt Law era of reform, all youth athletes should be protected,
not just those in public high schools.261 States should explicitly expand the
reach of their laws to cover recreational (nonschool-based) youth sports and
athletics in both middle and elementary schools.262 Some states have already
begun to expand their coverage. For example, California has expanded
coverage to charter and private schools,263 Indiana and Virginia to sports
organizations using school property,264 and Arkansas to all recreational youth
sports.265 Other states should continue to follow this trend.
In addition to expanding coverage, states must begin to strengthen
enforcement mechanisms.266 Even the most well-written statute is
meaningless if it is not enforced.267 In this sense, state statutes should specify
sanctions that will be imposed for school districts and coaches that fail to
comply with state laws.268 Cost-efficient yet effective sanctions could
include forfeiture of games, reduction of practice time, or suspension of
programs.269 In addition, an extra layer of enforcement should be added in
the form of anonymous reporting systems, modeled after whistleblower
provisions in other laws.270 This provision would allow parents, athletes, and
257. See supra Part I.C.1.
258. See supra Part I.C.1.
259. See supra Part II.A.2.
260. See supra Part II.A.3.
261. See supra notes 128–30 and accompanying text.
262. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
263. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49475 (West 2016).
264. IND. CODE § 20-34-7-1.5 (2016); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-271.5 (2017).
265. ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-710 (2017).
266. See supra Part II.B.
267. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
268. See supra Part II.B.1.
269. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 14, at 288.
270. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 1514A. Each provisionthe former
appearing in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act and the latter
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other interested parties to share information when coaches or health-care
providers do not adhere to the state’s TBI-prevention mandate.271
2. Reporting and Feedback Procedures
Once state legislatures expand their laws to give them teeth through
enforcement mechanisms, it is essential that states have tools in place to
evaluate the laws’ effectiveness.272 To determine whether the law is actually
effective, states must track the concussion history of individual athletes and
analyze this data;273 this type of analysis is imperative in any broad public
health initiative. The Vermont General Assembly has provided a model by
requiring the Vermont Traumatic Brain Injury Advisory Board to obtain
information necessary to create an annual report on the incidences of
concussions sustained by student athletes in Vermont in the previous school
year.274 Yet most other states have not taken this initiative, likely due to the
high costs associated with implementing such a procedure.275 Assuming that
cost is a barrier for many states,276 the CDC, which has begun to implement
similar tracking measures at the national level,277 should be tasked with
developing and implementing a national surveillance system. According to
the CDC, improved tracking can help establish more precise methods for TBI
diagnosis, improve outcome assessment, and compare the effectiveness and
costs of tests, treatments, and services.278
States should also develop procedures that require all youth athletes to
undergo baseline testing before the start of a new season.279 The individual
baseline produced by such testing would be used during the season to
determine whether a player’s cognitive functioning deviates from the
preseason norm.280 Thus, youth athletes would not be permitted to return to
play until their cognitive functioning returns to their preseason baseline; if
used properly, the risk of second impact syndrome would be greatly
reduced.281
The obvious drawback of baseline testing is its cost.282 The Federal
ConTACT Act,283 if it had passed, would have required computerized testing,
similar to ImPACT testing,284 for school-aged children, which would have
appearing in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002grants certain protections and incentives to
whistleblowers within the financial sector.
271. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
272. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
273. See Harvey, supra note 14, at 105–06.
274. 2013 Vt. Acts & Resolves 68.
275. See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
276. See Lueke, supra note 124, at 497–98.
277. See CDC, 2015 REPORT, supra note 21, at 29.
278. See id.
279. See Brandwein, supra note 75, at 47.
280. See id.
281. See id. at 54.
282. See id. at 44.
283. See supra notes 204–06 and accompanying text.
284. Some schools have begun to use a system of baseline testing called ImPACT. See
Lueke, supra note 124, at 488. ImPACT is a computerized system which provides a twenty-
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been funded with federal grants.285 In light of this bill’s failure, wealthier
schools have begun to fund baseline initiatives;286 however, in many other
school districts, especially those in rural areas where funding is severely
limited, there are no such initiatives.287 This is where Congress and state
legislatures should step in. The federal government, particularly executive
agencies like Health and Human Services or the Department of Education,
should demand increased funding to ensure the safety of youth athletes,288 a
relatively nonpartisan issue. In addition, state legislators can pursue
alternative sources of capital, such as partnerships with universities and
corporate donors.289 New Jersey, for example, has developed a particularly
innovative statutory solution.290 The statute applies a small surcharge (fifty
cents) to car registration fees, which is used to pay for the baseline testing of
high school athletes.291 Overall, while the cost of baseline testing is certainly
a concern, it is outweighed when viewed in comparison to the lifelong
injuries that the testing is designed to prevent.292
Finally, state legislatures should more clearly define when tort liability is
an available remedy because silence on this issue creates confusion among
courts, parents, and coaches.293 Such confusion is problematic because it has
potentially devastating consequences for youth athletes.294 States should be
left to choose the level of protection offered to various actors. While some
may choose a more liberal approach in allowing negligence claims, others
may decline to allow suit absent willful misconduct or gross negligence.295
At a minimum, state legislatures should expressly address this issue.296
Moreover, the issue of liability also arises when teams compete against other
teams in a different state.297 In this scenario, to prevent confusion, Congress
should provide a straightforward solution: teams should be required to abide
by the laws of their home state without regard to the state in which the teams
are competing.298

minute test to measure an athlete’s verbal and visual memory, reaction time, and processing
speed. Id. It can be used throughout the season to conduct subsequent tests that are then
compared to the injured athlete’s baseline data. Id.
285. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
286. See Brandwein, supra note 75, at 53–55.
287. See Lueke, supra note 124, at 498.
288. See Brandwein, supra note 75, at 30.
289. See Harvey, supra note 14, at 107.
290. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:40-41.7 (West 2017).
291. Id. § 39:3-8.2(1)(b).
292. See Lueke, supra note 124, at 489–90.
293. See supra notes 155–56 and accompanying text.
294. See supra Part II.B.2–3.
295. See Lueke, supra note 124, at 501.
296. See id.
297. See id. at 500.
298. See id.
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B. Addressing Primary Risks:
Confronting the Issue Before Impact
The most important goal that legislators should address is the prevention
of initial injury. For example, legislative mandates about how certain sports
must be played would almost certainly drive down concussion rates.299 To
date, legislators have largely avoided this form of intervention due, in part,
to lobbying by the NFL and the potential public backlash that might
accompany an alteration of a sport’s core nature.300 Moreover, certain
obstacles have continued to obstruct comprehensive reform. First, there is a
longstanding culture within sports that promotes playing through injury.301
Second, there is a widely held view that the traditional rules of sports are
essential and must remain unchanged.302 Third, there is an enduring belief
that governments should maintain a “hands-off” approach to regulating
sports.303 Through the enactment of laws in all fifty states and the District of
Columbia, states have begun to overcome this third hurdle, particularly with
regard to youth sports.304 Yet the first two hurdles remain. As a result, future
laws should emphasize specific rule changes and aim to change existing
attitudes and behaviors.
1. Rule Changes
While professional sports leagues have begun penalizing certain headimpacting maneuvers,305 there are still other interventions that would likely
reduce the risks of TBI.306 For instance, certain rule changes based on
epidemiologic data “have reduced concussion and neck injury in some sports:
299. See CDC, HEADS UP, supra note 26.
300. See supra notes 134, 232 and accompanying text.
301. See Koller, supra note 154, at 723.
302. See id. at 729–30.
303. See id. at 687–88.
304. See id. at 738–39 (noting that “schools should receive the least insulation from
government involvement”).
305. In 2010, the NFL implemented two new rules: First, any player who launches himself
off the ground and uses his helmet to strike a player in a defenseless posture in the head or
neck will be penalized. Second, when a player loses his helmet during the course of a play,
the play will be immediately whistled dead. New NFL Rules Designed to Limit Head Injuries,
NFL (July 26, 2012, 8:52 PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/09000d5d81990bdf/article/
new-nfl-rules-designed-to-limit-head-injuries [https://perma.cc/S9Y6-A74R]. The following
year, the NFL implemented further measures, including changes that have reduced the number
of kickoff returns, because athletes involved in these plays have a four times greater risk of
sustaining concussions than athletes involved in a running or passing play. See Harmon et al.,
supra note 67, at 5; Jarrett Bell, New NFL Kickoff Rule Could Be Game-Changer, USA TODAY
(Sept. 8, 2011, 9:40 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/SPORTS/usaedition/2011-09-09Cover-NFL-kickoff-rule_CV_U.htm [https://perma.cc/3PFV-945U]. Similarly, in 2011, the
NHL introduced a new rule that aimed to curtail blows to the head. See Jeff Z. Klein, With
Stricter Rule on Hits to the Head, Some N.H.L. Stars Are Split on a Full Ban, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 19, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/20/sports/hockey/nhls-top-stars-weigh-inon-hits-to-the-head.html [https://perma.cc/8GGJ-UA5X]. The new rule gave referees wider
discretion to call penalties for hits to the headregardless of the direction from which the hit
was deliveredand afforded the league greater authority to mete out stiffer suspensions for
egregious violations. Id.
306. See supra Part II.D.
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1) banning ‘spear tackling’ in American football, 2) enforcing no ‘checking
from behind’ in ice hockey, and 3) limiting ‘elbow to head’ contact in
soccer.”307 However, it remains an “unfortunate fact” that rule changes at
the amateur sports level often follow changes first made at the professional
level.308 Moreover, it has been easier for lawmakers to focus on secondary
interventions where the “core nature” of sports themselves is not directly
threatened.309
Moving forward, state legislatures should not wait for professional sports
leagues to act; rather, they should directly intervene in particular youth
sports, including football, ice hockey, and soccer.310 This type of legislation
would not require legislatures to reinvent the wheel, as many rule changes
have already been proposed by national sports governing bodies.311
Specifically, state legislatures should adopt the rule changes set forth by USA
Football, USA Hockey, and U.S. Soccerwhere they have not been adopted
alreadyso that they gain the force of law.312 In addition, state legislatures
should place limits on full-contact practices, both in terms of the techniques
utilized and permissible time limits.313 For instance, state legislatures can
follow California’s lead by limiting full-contact practices and placing time
restrictions on the full-contact portion of daily practice.314 Here too, state
legislatures can rely on other governing bodies as a guide. In 2012, Pop
Warner created standards to limit contact during football practices.315
Furthermore, in 2016, Ivy League football coaches decided to eliminate all
full-contact hitting practices during the regular season.316 While further
studies are needed to evaluate the effects of reducing physical contact at
307. Harmon et al., supra note 67, at 13 (footnote omitted).
308. See Wilson, supra note 14, at 251 (“Unfortunate in the sense that the rules governing
the conduct of sports at the professional level are not necessarily an appropriate model for the
rules that should govern sports at the amateur level, particularly where young athletes are the
participants.”).
309. Harvey, supra note 14, at 110.
310. See id. at 107.
311. In 2015, U.S. Soccer placed a ban on heading the ball for players ten years of age and
under. U.S. Soccer Provides Additional Information About Upcoming Player Safety
Campaign, U.S. SOCCER (Nov. 9, 2015), http://www.ussoccer.com/stories/2015/11/09/22/57/
151109-ussoccer-provides-additional-information-about-upcoming-player-safety-campaign
[https://perma.cc/T9HC-7Q49]. In 2011, USA Hockey banned body checking for players
twelve years of age and under. See Lindsey Barton Straus, Body Checking Banned at Pee Wee
Level, MOMSTEAM (Mar. 5, 2013), http://www.momsteam.com/usa-hockey/usa-hockeyconsider-ban-body-checking-at-pee-wee-level [https://perma.cc/K64B-QHPH].
312. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 222(d) (2017) (prohibiting coaches, trainers, and
others from encouraging or permitting a student to engage in any “unreasonably dangerous
athletic technique that unnecessarily endangers the health of a student, including using a
helmet or any other sports equipment as a weapon” such as a helmet-to-helmet hit).
313. See CDC, HEADS UP, supra note 26.
314. See Lowrey, supra note 243, at 68.
315. See supra note 237 and accompanying text. These regulations limit contact drills to
one-third of practice time and ban full head-on blocking and tackling drills in which players
line up more than three yards apart. Limited Contact in Practice, POP WARNER (June 13, 2012),
http://www.popwarner.com/safety/practice_contact.htm [https://perma.cc/6H2N-7GB8].
316. See Ken Belson, Ivy League Moves to Eliminate Tackling at Football Practices, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 1, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/02/sports/ncaafootball/ivy-leaguemoves-to-eliminate-tackling-at-practices.html [https://perma.cc/29QG-V74Q].
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practice,317 one study has already suggested that such rules have succeeded
in reducing concussion rates among youth athletes.318
2. Changes in Attitudes and Behaviors
While state legislatures have the power to propose and enact legislation
relatively quickly, changing societal attitudes and behaviors is a more gradual
process.319 President Barack Obama addressed this issue: “[W]e need more
athletes to understand how important it is to do what we can to prevent
injuries and to admit them when they do happen. We have to change a culture
that says you suck it up.”320 Much of this change should be driven by state
legislation, which aims to educate coaches and youth athletes on the dangers
of TBI.321 However, professional sports leagues can also fuel this cultural
shift.322 If professional leagues and athletes become more proactive and
candid about the seriousness of TBI, this may facilitate a change in behavior
among amateur leagues and youth athletes, given that changes by
professional leagues tend to be followed at amateur levels.323 A more indepth discussion of actions to be taken by professional sports leagues is
beyond the scope of this Note. However, short-term changesin the form
of state legislationwill likely lead to longer-term and more permanent
changes in attitudes and behaviors.324
C. The Model Statute: A New Benchmark
The burden is on state legislatures to adequately address both the primary
and secondary risks of TBI among youth athletes.325 Up to this point, most
states have looked to Washington’s Lystedt Law as a model statute.326
However, moving forward, state legislatures should amend their youth

317. See, e.g., 2014 Conn. Acts 14-66 (Reg. Sess.) (tabling an enacted version of the bill
pending further study of this issue before signing the bill into law).
318. See Timothy A. McGuine et al., Effect of New Rule Limiting Full Contact Practice on
Incidence of Sport Related Concussion in High School Football Players, AM. ACAD.
PEDIATRICS (Oct. 24, 2015, 2:50 PM), http://aap.confex.com/aap/2015/webprogram/
Paper31701.html [https://perma.cc/9STE-8387].
319. See Wilson, supra note 14, at 253–54.
320. See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the Healthy Kids and Safe
Sports Concussion Summit (May 29, 2014, 11:19 AM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2014/05/29/remarks-president-healthy-kids-and-safe-sports-concussion-summit
[https://perma.cc/T89H-93Y9].
321. See Koller, supra note 154, at 721–23.
322. For example, in 2013, the “Heads Up Football” initiative was introduced, with
financial backing from the NFL and oversight provided by USA Football. See Alan Schwarz,
N.F.L.-Backed Youth Program Says It Reduced Concussions. The Data Disagrees., N.Y.
TIMES (July 27, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/28/sports/football/nfl-concussionsyouth-program-heads-up-football.html [https://perma.cc/XB3Z-L5HA].
The program
provides a series of in-person and online courses for coaches to learn better safety procedures
and proper tackling drills. Id.
323. See Wilson, supra note 14, at 251.
324. See Koller, supra note 154, at 722.
325. See supra Part III.A–B.
326. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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concussion statutes to incorporate the following provisions. Each state
statute should
(1) clearly define the statute’s purposeto protect all youth athletes both
before and after an injury occurs;327
(2) expressly expand coverage to include private recreational sports;328
(3) strengthen the education tenet by requiring all coaches to complete
annual concussion-specific training;329
(4) require written medical clearance from a licensed health-care provider
trained in the evaluation and management of concussions before a
youth athlete can return to play;330
(5) require the state’s department of health, or a subdivision thereof, to
establish an anonymous hotline that allows interested stakeholders to
report instances where they believe the statute has been violated;331
(6) require the state’s department of health, or a subdivision thereof, to
provide baseline testing to all youth athletes on an annual basis;332
(7) apply a small surcharge to car registration fees, whereby 100 percent
of the proceeds are used to fund baseline testing;333
(8) impose sanctionsspecifically the penalties that have been
implemented in Pennsylvaniaon coaches who fail to satisfy the
statutory mandate;334 and
(9) expressly address the issue of civil liability, specifically that coaches,
officials, and volunteers are immune from civil liability unless their
action or inaction constitutes gross negligence or willful
misconduct.335

D. The Next Step: Incentivizing State Legislatures
to Adopt the New Benchmark
Now that all fifty states and the District of Columbia have adopted some
form of youth sports concussion legislation,336 state legislatures should
examine whether these laws offer adequate protections to youth athletes.
Most state statutes, as currently constituted, are inadequate.337 However,
rather than depending on state legislatures to act of their own accord, large
institutional actorssuch as the CDC and sports governing bodiesshould
incentivize states to update and strengthen their laws. The intricacies of these
incentives or lobbying efforts are beyond the purview of this Note.
Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge the fact that, while this Note
provides an analysis of existing state laws and recommends provisions that
should be included in all state statutes, this is by no means the end of the

327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.

See supra Part III.A–B.
See supra notes 115, 117 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 100–04 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 83–85 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 241, 270 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 279–81 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 290–92 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 145–47 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 295–96 and accompanying text.
See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.A–B.
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discussion. Further research, analysis, and commentary are needed to ensure
that all youth athletes are adequately protected.
CONCLUSION
Increasing awareness of the causes and effects of youth TBI presents a dual
responsibility for legislators and regulators: on the one hand, it creates the
need to assess and manage TBIs after they have occurred, and on the other,
the epidemic demands a solution for preventing TBI in the first instance.
Although state legislatures have begun to address the former, they have failed
to address the latter. In light of this epidemic, this Note surveys the current
landscape of state legislation and categorizes the existing state laws into tiers
based on the strength of protections that each tier offers to youth athletes.
While Washington State has provided a decent starting point, other state
legislatures must continue to innovate in terms of the safeguards they
provide. By placing states into tiers, this Note challenges state legislatures
that currently lag behind leading states to draw inspiration from statutes
within the Leaders tier. Moreover, by recommending certain statutory
provisions within an updated model statute, this Note also provides states
within the Leaders tier with a concrete goal to which they should aspire.
In response to current inadequate legislation, states should adopt the model
statutory provisions discussed in Part III.C, which target both the primary and
secondary risks of youth concussions. The provisions of this new model offer
greater protections than the existing benchmark, Washington’s Lystedt Law,
in that they expand coverage and require specific feedback mechanisms.
State legislatures should amend their youth sports concussion laws to match
the provisions of the updated benchmark. State legislatures should also
expand the scope of their youth sports concussion laws to ensure that all
children receive adequate protections.
Once Zackery Lystedt began to clutch the sides of his helmet, writhing in
pain, he should have been removed from the game and prevented from
reentering until he received written medical clearance from a trained healthcare professional. But that alone is not a solution. A more comprehensive
resolution, such as the one advanced by this Note, provides greater
protections for children like Zackery, both before and after they run onto the
playing surface.
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APPENDIX: A TIERED APPROACH

Tier (# of Statutes)
Laggards (4)
Loafers (7)
Lystedters (14)

Lystedters-Plus (16)

Leaders (10)

Characterization
No requirement of
written clearance
Weak education tenets
Match the three basic
Lystedt tenets, but fail to
innovate beyond these
three requirements
Training of coaches is
expressly required,
rather than suggested
Reach youth athletes in
both public schools and
private recreational
sports

Statutes
GA, ID, MS, WY
CO, MN, MO, NH,
NY, SC, UT
AK, AZ, CA, DC, FL,
IA, KS, NC, NE, NV,
OK, VA, WA, WI
CT, DE, HI, KY, MA,
ME, MT, ND, NJ,
NM, PA, RI, SD, TX,
VT, WV
AL, AR, IL, IN, LA,
MD, MI, OH, OR, TN

